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including the law against

are

transfers in fraud of creditors. These rules, in effect,
assign to the enterpriser (as profit or loss) the con

sequences of his business decisions. Since he thus
takes the consequences, he has an incentive to act
responsibly-i.e., to act in the light of reasonable an

ticipations.
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For

our

purposes,

so, since discussions

corporation invariably assume that in
enterprise has this desirable characteristic.
What such discussions question is the relevance of this
analysis to the large corporation, with its separation of
dividual

ownership

from control.
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of first-year students meet periodically at
above, Professor Kalven was the speaker.

operates under the general

rules of contracts, torts, and
backed up by remedial law,
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It is not

only

lunch with the

the corporate form of

Bigelou:

organization,

however, which creates problems concerning separa
tion of the elements of enterprise. Such problems arise
as

soon

as

the

enterprise makes

use

of

employees.

Basic rules of agency law deal with these problems
and are best understood, it seems to me, as efforts to

prevent such separation of risk, control, and profit as
jeopardize responsible m:magement. The rule

would

respondeat superior, always difficult to justify on or
dinary tort principles, is understandable as an effort
to place the risks of the enterprise upon the enterprise,
to require the enterpriser to weigh such r-isks in mak
ing his business calculations. Similarly, the liability
of the undisclosed principal, which is hard to explain
on contract
principles, represents an effort to assure
responsibility in the decisions made by the owner of
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and shareholders, and of holders of different classes
of shares-provisions which leave the parties free to

rights,

but which formalize the way

in which the determination must be made and which
in the absence of

rules

provide

applicable
determination by the parties. A statute
this theory might spell out the application
of deceit in the

corporation setting.
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contrary

drawn
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of the law
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go

further and relieve lenders and investors of the burden

of

asking the appropriate' questions, creating

affirm

ative duties of disclosure in order to make it

probable

that decisions

exercise of

voting rights,

as

more
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responsibly made.

to commitment

etc. will be

might also codify other general rules
particular application to corporate organiza
such
as the rules
tion,
prescribing fiduciary standards
of loyalty and prohibiting transfers in fraud of crediSuch
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In such

codification, the rules might be strength

ened to block evasion
situation.

corporate

In

opportunities peculiar

to

the

short, the second theory still

looks to individual decisions made with responsibility,
but it advocates the creation of a statutory setting

fostering

such

responsibilty.
theory prescribes a more drastic
lest
risks
be. inadvertently assumed and
remedy,
It prescribes restrictions
exercised.
powers inadvisedly
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legislature as including
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allocate risk, control,

to

It conceives the task of the

that of

identifying particular

types of allocation which are deemed to jeopardize
responsible investment and management. For example,
the statutes might outlaw nonvoting stock, prescribe a

specified margin of safety
more than a
simple majority
readjustments.
A
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for various corporate
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should be added which is

applicable

to
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have been established.

quiring

that the consideration for shares, whether par
no-par value, shall be fixed in dollars and by im
posing shareholders' liability in terms not of par or

ported

or

my second

stated

value, but of the full consideration fixed for the
(subject to good faith valuation of property
transferred in payment). The same statutes, however,
often leave creditors without protection against

adapting general principles

shares

since most of the statutes take few

"partial liquidation," even to the extent
capital." The extension or clarification of
stock-watering liability in these statutes cannot, there
fore, be interpreted as an implementation of the
margin-of-safety notion, but merely as an effort to
check the obtaining of credit through an intentionally
misleading balance sheet.
As already suggested, twentieth-century statutes
have often permitted formal reduction of capital with
distributions in

of the stated

protection of existing creditors.

out

statutes, following
even
the necessity
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they mature
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Some of the recent statutes,

revitalize the
Texas

nor

course

of business.

however,

retain and

margin-of-safety concept. Thus,

North Carolina authorizes

neither

distributions

"out of" stated

capital, and both put restraints
upon distribution of surplus created by reduction of
stated capital. Texas dramatically departs from the
Model Act by providing that distributions of reduction
surplus shall make directors liable to creditors existing
directly

the time of the reduction in the

at

event

of later in

solvency." North Carolina requires that any distribu
tion of capital surplus (including reduction surplus)
must leave assets

least twice the amount of the

at

debts." Both of these

statutes

appear

distributions which would
which

designed to block
creditors to risks

subject
they might not reasonably anticipate.

provision

establishes

a

The Texas

limit to creditors' risks in terms

capital, but the stated capital may be fixed at
arbitrary minimum. The North Carolina provision

of stated
an

cannot be

reduced to nominal effect, since it covers
capital, but also capital surplus; the

stated

to

theory, clarifying

representation

or

to

as

They thus illustrate
original agreement
providing relief by

the

risk and

of

contracts

steps

or

deceit. But

in this direc

tion, they illustrate basically the first or "enabling act"
theory, leaving it to creditors to make their own
bargains for the limitation of their risk. As a re
sult, elaborate covenants restricting dividends and
other distributions and share purchases are now com
mon features not
only of bond and debenture inden
tures, but also of other types of agreements for exten
sion of credit.
2. Promotion and

security flotation
statute, courts have imposed upon ccr
porate promoters duties beyond those established by
from
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the
to
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law of deceit. Promotors have been held

be fiduciaries

subject

to

affirmative
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of dis

duty

closure, for breach of which the corporation may, in
certain situations, recover. Btit'it has been open to the
promoter to aVOId this result by having all the shares
issued initially to himself, with sales to the public
made

him rather than

by
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situation,
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promoter
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In this

corporation.

free

is

from

common-law

liability, unless his conduct amounted to deceit. It is
usually not difficult to arrange the promotion trans
the form which thus

in

actions

risk of

minimizes

liability.
The recent North Carolina statute is

ing

this

loophole.

"watered shares"
lation

unique

in clos

includes within its definition of

It

(which
assessment) all

are

made

subject

to cancel

shares issued to promoters
for overvalued property which unfairly dilute the
holdings cf other shareholders to whom adequate
or

disclosure

has

not

been

made.P

Carolina, corporation lawyers

can

in

North

longer

defeat

Thus,
no

the

requirement of disclosure by mere technical ar
rangement of promotion transactions.
Draftsmen of other ccrporation statutes have ig
this

problem, perhaps because the separate
or "blue
sky" laws provide statutory
remedies for purchasers of stock. While these statutes
are
beyond the scope of this symposium, one point may
be noted as to how they illustrate the general theories

nored

securities acts

only
margin originally fixed may be reduced, however, so
long as there remains a margin of 100 per cent over

considered in this paper. This is the familiar contrast
between the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the

debts. None of the statutes contains any substantial
requirement of original junior investment.

North Carolina

not

In this

field, therefore,

none

of the

statutes

reflects

the

"paternal responsibility" theory, as do the Public
Utility Holding Company Act and chapter ten of the
Bankruptcy Act, with their control of debt-equity
ratios.'? What the recent statutes do,
varying de
grees, is to protect a margin once established or purin

typical

law. The federal act, like the
promoters' profit provision, is a disclo

state securities

act; it thus illustrates my second theory, supple
menting and reinforcing the law of deceit in order to
sure

promote responsible investment. The state securities
acts, on the other hand, usually vest in their admin
istrators

power to halt the sale of securi
deemed to be "inequitable" or which

discretionary

ties which

are

would "tend to work

a

fraud."

For

example,
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up and rearrangement of sections, but unwieldy sen
tence structure still
predominates. The Model Act has,
a
new
look:
it is
indeed,
vastly easier on the eyes.

(Some of my friends out here in the provinces say
that it's the difference between Chicago and New York
of corporate

styles

draftsmanship.)
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over a
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The attack has

social

philosophers

un

come

and

from economists and law teachers and

business executives.
This movement began with Thorstein Veblen, who
caustically depicted the modern corporation, with its
inactive stockholders, as a prime example of "absentee
ownership."48 Of greater importance, perhaps, were
the pronouncements of

twenties,

heralding

corporation

a new

executives in the

orientation of mmagement

in trying to defend his limited
against minority stockholder attack, dis

loyalty. Henry Ford,
dividends

claimed any intention to maximize profits and pro
posed, instead, to reduce prices for the henefit of car
buyers and to create more jobs. While the Supreme
Court of Michigan flatly rejected this view of corpo
rate purposes;" other leading executives espoused the
same
philosophy. Owen D. Young wrote that he con
sidered himself a trustee not merely for stockholders,

for the corporate "institution" -i.e., for stock
holders, employees, customers, and the general pub
but

lic.50
In

1932, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means,

The Modern

Corporation

and Private

in

Property, gave

this idea, and their work

was
widely
outstanding importance.
Tracing the extent of the separation of ownership from
control in the modern corporation, they challenged the

strong support
hailed

as

a

to

contribution of

ethical claim of the inactive investor

profits

of

industry. They

to

the residual

declared that'"

seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive,
that the "control" of the great corporations should develop
into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims

it

various groups in the community and assigning to each a
portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy
rather than private cupidity.

by

H. Kulp, of Norman, Oklahoma, Professor
of Law at the University of Oklahoma and national
of the Order of the Coif.
Victor
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secretary

True, when Professor E. Merrick Dodd called for

legal recognition

of the

new

principle

of wider respon-
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Progress of the

New Law

social valuations and thus providing a system of easily recog
nizable signals by which individuals can reconcile their own
self-interest and the social interest.
[Thus, the business
.

.

.

[He
should] rely primarily on profit as his guide.
should depart from this guide only when it leads him toward]
restrictive monopoly, exploitation, fraud, misrepresentation,
political bribery, waste of natural resources, economic inse
man

curity,

.

.

.

etc.

Here, again, these

terms

offer little

conscientious director

guidance

to

the

misrepresentation
(except
by law).
In general, one may question the extent to which
socially responsible deliberation would actually lead
as

to

and other conduct forbidden

management

to

decisions different from those indi

by long-range profit considerations. For ex
ample, concern for employee goodwill might well
cated

cause

management

to

seek ways to cushion the effects

Buildings: March,

19.58

of

production cut-backs, automation, plant relocation,
If advocates of "social responsibility" would have
management go much farther in maintaining unprofit
able operations, it is by no means clear that such ac
tion would be socially responsible. And with respect
to price policy, however seriously management might
regard its social responsibility, perhaps the influences
etc.

operating

to

further the social interest would still be

those

resulting
principally
products and producers for

from competition among
consumers'

must

spending.s?

In

be concerned with the

any event, management
extent to which the new concept of corporate
responsi
bility may influence behavior of consumers or employ

If

public opinion comes to expect corporations to
some new
responsibility, this is a fact which
profit-conscious management can not ignore.
ees.

assume
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responsibility is
rights. This is
Drucker after

a

proposed in the name of social
the abolition of shareholder voting

a

advocated

measure

period

as

official

dence

by Peter F.
philosopher-in-resi

at General Motors.
According to Drucker, "there
absolutely nothing in the nature of investment that
either requires or justifies
ownership rights, that is
rights of control"; voting power should be "vested in

is

perpetuity

in the

Board of

Directors," who would

elect to their number

Law School

Drucker brushes aside
fluence of

opposition.
fare,

of the great corporations whose securities are widely distributed
and largely voted by management proxies, effective control
over

many basic

group-perhaps
one;

policy decisions
in

a

very

is

lodged

in

some

small minority, hut in

stockholder
an

effective

arising

from the

possibility

of

organized

examples of proxy war
assert that these
possibilities

wholesome stimulus or restraint upon manage
When poor management is reflected in reduced
earnings, the resulting decline in stock prices may
attractive

create
a

not

opportunities

to

accumulate shares

bid for control. To be sure, the stock market is
an ideal mechanism for the
discipline of manage

But, whatever may be the dangers from corpo
"raiders," it is at least doubtful that management

ment.

responsibility
possible

to

would be

improved by making it im
acquire working control through purchases

of stock.?"
The
not to

these

...

the in

ment.

ration

case

only

not

But after recent

it would be rash to

already existing in fact. Criticizing this position, Lloyd
K. Garrison
expressed belief that'"
in the

disapproves

exert no

in

even

or

particular stockholders, but also the gen

eral influence

"representatives" of investors,
management, and the "plant community."61 Drucker
regards this as merely legalizing the disfranchisement

upon close examination it will be found that
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perennial insistence that there just
way of disciplining corporate profit
seeking. Expressing his disappointment with Bowen's
report, the Rev. F. Ernest Johnson asked almost
wearily "Is it not possible to devise instruments of a
more authentic
corporate responsibility?"64 But the
of
a
prospect
break-through on this front is not en
important

as

must be some

couraging,

a

new

for what is demanded is

which would operate neither
sponsibility and competitive

political
The

through

a

contrivance

individual

markets

nor

re

straining
Modern

to

catch Professor Berle's

Corporation

and the

City

of "The

VISIOn

of God."65 But in

the meantime, we need not be defensive about the
statutes of North Carolina and Texas-or even those
of Illinois and Delaware. None of them, to be sure, is
a model ordinance for the
City of God. But the cor

porate organizations they make possible
not

inappropriate
City.

for economic

activity

are

institutions

in the

Earthly

through

controls.

philosophy has thus far succeeded in pro
ducing only an unresolved discontent with existing
corporation law. It has obscured the values served by
the older philosophies and the fact that these philoso
phies also can lay claim to the "social responsibility"
label. Perhaps corporation law critics should keep
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